Page Denied

S E C R E T

15 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM: 25X1
                  Chairman, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
                  Subcommittee

SUBJECT: Comments on NSA's Terms of Reference (TOR) for the
                  Countermeasures Advisory Panel (CAP)

        1. This memorandum addresses my concerns with what appears
to be not only duplication of effort but also a source of
confusion within the U.S. Government on where the responsibility
lies for decisions involving Technical Surveillance Counter-
measures (TSCM) and physical security matters. This could, at a
minimum, lead to the divulgence of information outside
appropriate channels by having more than one U.S. Government
committee considering matters pertaining to the same technical
discipline. The responses below are keyed to the various
sections of the TOR document.

   ●   Covering Memo and General Section of TOR (PARA 1)

25X1   mentions the establishment of a superior
        technical base. The Technical Surveillance
        Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS) has already
        established a mechanism to task collectors with
        targeting on hostile technical surveillance efforts and
        information on capabilities. We also have a data base
        and distribution system with an approval mechanism for
        passing information to both the private sector and
        foreign governments when it is beneficial to the U.S.
        Government. Through both the TSCS and the R&D
        Subcommittee, the Intelligence Community (IC) fosters
        joint R&D and equipment purchase efforts as well as
        ensuring commonality of training through the Interagency
        Training Center (ITC). Testing is done for the IC at
        two facilities with information passed to all members,
        other government agencies and contractors where
        appropriate.

WARNING NOTICE   25X1
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Comments on NSA's Terms of Reference (TOR) for the
           Countermeasures Advisory Panel (CAP)

- **TOR - PURPOSE (PARA 3)**

    a.   As stated above, the TSCS, R&D Subcommittee and the
         Physical Security Working Group under SECOM already
         provide a forum for the IC and other government
         agencies for examining vulnerabilities in the TSCM
         and Physical Security arenas. This includes
         methods, standards, procedures and training.

    b.   The above organizations also advise and assist
         appropriate program managers on issues relating to
         the formulation and implementation of national
         policy, standards and procedures where required.

    c.   The same SECOM elements provide liaison with all
         U.S. Government organizations, non-government
         organizations [   ] on issues
         concerning technical security countermeasures. In
         addition the TSCS is _already_ set up to do this and
         has been doing it for years, with excellent
         results. This includes export control oversight
         for the IC on TSCM equipment.

    f.   The TSCS and the R&D Subcommittee maintain a
         working forum for TSCM and physical security
         hardware for the IC, including membership on GSA's
         Interagency Committee on Security Equipment
         (IACSE). This includes R&D and lab testing
         facilities for both equipment and "FINDS".

    g.   TSCS oversees the ITC for all U.S. Government TSCM
         training but more specifically for the IC.

    hi&j The Security Committee sponsors and oversees
         various seminars and training courses to promote
         awareness in all security areas including education
         and training.

25X1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

SUBJECT: Comments on NSA's Terms of Reference (TOR) for the
           Countermeasures Advisory Panel (CAP)

In summary of the above, it can safely be said that SECOM
already provides for the same services that the CAP, TOR proposes
to establish in the areas of TSCM and Physical Security. It is
not wise to have two disparate groups involved in the same areas
and doing things that may be at odds with each other. The
spokesman already exists.

Paragraph 4 would appear to be contradictory to all that goes
on before in the TOR. They have gone to great extremes to
involve themselves in TSCM and physical security areas where
there is already a cognizant authority for the IC (the largest
user of these services).

25X1

S E C R E T